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In conﬂict tasks, congruency effects are modulated by the sequence of preceding trials.This
modulation has been interpreted as a strategic reconﬁguration of cognitive control,
depending on the amount of conﬂict encountered on the very last trial, and occurring
unconditionally whenever there is time to produce it (Notebaert et al., 2006). Jiménez and
Méndez (2013) arranged a 4-choice Stroop task with a response-to-stimulus interval (RSI)
of 0 ms, and they found that, under these conditions, congruency effects may become
dissociated from the explicit expectancies assessed over analogous, but independent,
trials. The present study generalizes this phenomenon to a condition with larger RSI, and
it shows that participants’ performance does not rely on expectancies unless the task
includes a speciﬁc requirement to generate and report on these expectancies. The results
are interpreted as providing new insights with respect to the status of conﬂict adaptation
effects.
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INTRODUCTION
Is conﬂict adaptation an illusion? The response to this question
may depend on the meaning of the italicized expression. If it is
taken as a descriptive label, referring to the fact that congruency
effects are adaptively modulated by the congruency of the previ-
ous trials, then we will argue that this is not an illusion, but rather
it is a pervasive phenomenon resulting from the highly dynamic
and adaptive nature of the cognitive system, which always takes
advantage of its previous experience to process and respond to the
upcoming events in ways similar to those practiced in the past.
If, on the other hand, conﬂict adaptation is strictly deﬁned as
the result of a top–down expectancy, or as a strategic reconﬁgu-
ration of the cognitive control system depending on the conﬂict
encountered on the very last trial, and occurring unconditionally
whenever there is time to produce it, i.e., as a result of a con-
trol process which takes about 200 ms to complete, as suggested
by Notebaert et al. (2006), then we will contend that this is more
an exception than the rule, and that this kind of process is only
activated under very speciﬁc conditions.
Cognitive conﬂict arises whenever there are two features in
a display which are potentially incongruent with each other. In
the traditional Stroop task, for instance, participants are told to
respond to the color in which a word is written, and congruency
effects refer to the fact that people respond faster when the color
is congruent with the meaning of that word (e.g., “GREEN” writ-
ten in green), than when they are incongruent with each other
(e.g., “GREEN” written in red). The most popular way to analyze
conﬂict adaptation in this context has been to look at the “con-
gruency sequence effect” (CSE), which arises as a difference in the
effect of congruency depending on the congruency of the previ-
ous trial. As a rule, the effect of congruency tends to increase after
a congruent trial, and it tends to decrease after an incongruent
trial. However, in those experiments using fewer than four differ-
ent stimuli and responses, it becomes problematic to distinguish
between the alleged effects of conﬂict adaptation and those poten-
tially caused by episodic memory factors, such as the immediate
repetition of a trial (Mayr et al., 2003), or the repetition of a feature
that reappears immediately in a different role (i.e., a target feature
reappearing as a distractor, or vice versa, Hommel et al., 2004).
To avoid both total and partial repetitions, Jiménez andMéndez
(2013) arranged a 4-choice Stroop task, and they grouped the four
possible colors in two alternating pairs, so that trials displaying the
word “RED” or “GREEN” printed in red or green, alternated with
trials showing the word “BLUE” or “YELLOW” printed in blue
or yellow. These conditions, which are structurally analogous to
those used in some variants of the ﬂanker task (Mayr et al., 2003)
or of the prime-probe arrow task (Kim and Cho, 2014; Schmidt
and Weissman, 2014), served not only to avoid immediate feature
repetitions, but also to maintain a relatively high proportion of
congruent trials (50%), without associating the distractors more
often with the congruent response than with any of the possi-
ble incongruent responses (see Schmidt and De Houwer, 2011 or
Mordkoff, 2012, for discussions about how contingency learning
may get confounded with the CSE in congruency tasks). In order
to reduce the potential effects of explicit expectancies, Jiménez and
Méndez (2013) set the response-to-stimulus interval (RSI) to 0ms,
and they found that the CSE disappeared under these conditions,
at least when it was measured in the standard way, as the impact
of the congruency of the last trial on the congruency effect mea-
sured on the following trial. However, when the congruency of a
larger set of previous trials was taken into account, they obtained a
signiﬁcant linear trend, showing that the effect of congruency was
inversely proportional to the amount of conﬂict accumulated over
the last few trials. Thus, the effect became maximal after a run of
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three consecutive congruent trials (C,C,C,-), but it decreased pro-
gressively after runs of two (I,C,C,-) or just one (x,I,C,-) previous
congruent trial, and it decreased further after runs of one (x,C,I,-),
two (C,I,I,-), or three (I,I,I,-) consecutive incongruent trials1.
Interestingly, the linear pattern observed in the measures of
reaction time (RT) from Jiménez and Méndez (2013) could not
be explained in terms of the explicit expectancies developed over
those larger contexts, since those expectancies were measured
independently over different blocks, and they revealed the devel-
opment of a bias opposite to the effects observed in themeasures of
RT. According to the gambler’s fallacy (Jarvik, 1951), participants’
expectancies were biased to predict an incongruent successor after
a series of two or more consecutive congruent trials, whereas the
RT measured in those low-conﬂict contexts showed the largest
advantage in favor of responding to these supposedly“unexpected”
congruent trials. Reciprocally, after a series of two or more incon-
gruent trials, participants reported to be expecting a change to a
congruent successor, but these high-conﬂict contexts resulted in
the minimal difference in RT between responding to a congruent
and to an incongruent successor.
The dissociation found in Jiménez and Méndez (2013) between
explicit expectancies and long-range conﬂict adaptation effects
was interpreted by the authors as indicating that explicit predic-
tions would not be affecting performance in speeded conditions,
but that the observed adaptation effects would reﬂect an iner-
tial adaptation to the amount of conﬂict (or lack of conﬂict)
experienced over the last few trials, whichwould improve respond-
ing to those trials which make analogous control demands to
those made by the series of previous trials (see also Lamers and
Roelofs, 2011; Schlaghecken and Martini, 2012, for similar con-
clusions)2. However, given that this pattern of results had been
obtained in conditions which minimized the chances of devel-
oping and exploiting any explicit prediction, and in which those
expectancies were measured over independent blocks, differing
widely in their temporal arrangement with respect to the regular
Stroop blocks, we set to conceptually replicate these results under
temporal conditions which may leave enough room for strategic
processes to operate. According to Notebaert et al. (2006), an RSI
of 200 ms might be enough to produce a top-down reconﬁgura-
tion of the control system. However, because recent parametric
studies have documented that the CSEs are usually larger with
1A run of trials is deﬁned backward, as the maximum number of consecutive trials
from a previous context which belong to a given congruency class. For instance, a
run of two congruent trials (I,C,C,-) is deﬁned as the context in which trials n-1
and n-2 are both congruent, but trial n-3 is incongruent. A shorter run of just
one congruent trial (x,I,C,-) is deﬁned as a context in which trial n-1 is congruent
(C) but trial n-2 is incongruent (I). In that case, the nature of trial n-3 becomes
irrelevant (x).
2In this context, we will refer to the pattern obtained by Jiménez and Méndez (2013)
as a conceptual “dissociation” between expectancies and conﬂict adaptation effects,
even though in statistical terms their results showed a negative association, rather
than a statistical dissociation. Given that it is conceptually very implausible that
expecting a congruent successor could directly result in a slower RT to these expected
trials, the conclusion inferred from that negative association was that expectancies
and CSE should be driven by independent factors: whereas the CSE could reﬂect
an inertial adaptation to the amount of conﬂict experienced over the last few trials,
expectancies would be built exclusively when they are explicitly required, and they
would be modulated by some sort of anti-inertial, or compensating bias, resembling
the gambler’s fallacy.
RSI between 500 and 1000 ms (Egner et al., 2010; Duthoo et al.,
2014) we decided to set a ﬁxed RSI of 750 ms, that could be
long enough to allow for the development of strategic operations,
but not so long as to dilute the effects of the series of previous
trials.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The experiment was conducted in accordance with the Spanish
regulations on behavioral research. Eighteen students of psychol-
ogy from the University of Santiago de Compostela participated
in the experiment in exchange for a monetary fee. The procedure
closely followed that of Experiment 1 from Jiménez and Méndez
(2013), with the exception that the RSI was ﬁxed at 750 ms. The
task required participants to respond to the color of a word that
might be written in red, blue, yellow, and green, by using, respec-
tively, the keys corresponding to the letters “z,” “x,” “n,” and “m,”
which were covered by congruently colored stickers. Responses
were emitted using the index and middle ﬁngers of both hands.
After a short practice block in which participants got familiar with
the mapping between colors and keys, using words unrelated to
the colors, participants completed ﬁve experimental blocks with
Stroop stimuli, consisting of the Spanish words for red (rojo),
blue (azul), yellow (amarillo), and green (verde). Participants were
instructed to ignore the meaning of those words, and to respond
exclusively on their color. They were also informed that the color
could be congruent with the word meaning in approximately a
half of the trials, but that color and word meaning would be
incongruent with each other in the other half of trials. Errors
were explicitly marked by a tone, and the stimulus remained on
the screen until the correct key was pressed. The next trial arose
after an RSI of 750 ms, composed of a ﬁxation point appear-
ing at the center of the screen for 500 ms, and a blank interval
of 250 ms which preceded the next word. At the end of each
block, participants were informed about the percentage of correct
responses produced over the last block, and theywere asked to keep
responding as fast as possible, while maintaining the level of errors
below 10%.
To avoid color repetitions over successive trials, the four col-
ors were grouped into alternating pairs, producing an alternation
between trials showing the word “RED” or “GREEN” printed in
red or in green, and trials showing the word “BLUE” or “YEL-
LOW” printed in blue or in yellow. The colors grouped into a
target/distractor pair were selected so that their responses were
assigned to different hands, thus avoiding that the alternating color
pattern would amount to a pattern of alternating hands (cf. Kim
and Cho, 2014, Experiment 2). Each block contained 176 trials,
including exactly 88 congruent and 88 incongruent trials. The runs
of trials were also controlled so as to conform to those expected
by chance (see Perruchet et al., 2006). Thus, we included as many
runs of a single congruent trial (16) or of a single incongruent
trial (16), as there were runs of two consecutively congruent trials
(16) or of two consecutively incongruent trials (16). From here
on, because chance probabilities of producing larger runs should
be multiplicatively smaller than those of their smaller compo-
nents, we included 8 runs of three consecutively congruent trials,
8 runs of three consecutively incongruent trials, four runs of four
consecutively congruent trials, and 4 runs of four consecutively
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incongruent trials. The probability of producing still larger runs
by chance was too low to permit a reliable measure of their effects,
and therefore we set length-four as the maximum length of tri-
als of the same type. All these runs were randomly intermixed for
each block and participant, with the constraint that congruent and
incongruent runs should alternate with each other, so as to avoid
producing larger runs out of the concatenation of shorter ones. As
a consequence of this speciﬁc design, not only the proportion of
congruent and incongruent trials, but also the conditional prob-
abilities of ﬁnding repetitions or alternations of congruency were
balanced for each individual block.
Blocks 1, 3, and 4 were arranged as standard Stroop blocks. In
blocks 2 and 5 participants also responded to regular Stroop trials,
but after each of these trials they were presented with an explicit
measure of their expectancies. At the beginning of each of these
Expectancy blocks, participants were awarded with 100 points,
and they were asked to bet 3, 2, or 1 of their points depend-
ing on the certainty with which they could predict that the next
trial was going to be congruent or incongruent: (3) “sure,” (2)
“fairly sure,” or (1) “guessing.” Participants reported their bets
verbally, and the corresponding score was entered by the experi-
menter manually using a second keyboard. The next trial appeared
750 ms after the bet was entered, including an update of their
remaining points, together with the next Stroop trial, which also
served as an indirect feedback on the accuracy of the previous
prediction.
RESULTS
Jiménez and Méndez (2013) analyzed RT exclusively over the reg-
ular Stroop blocks, mainly because in their Expectancy blocks the
predictions were entered by the participants with the aid of a com-
puter mouse, which forced them to continually shift their right
hand from the keyboard to the mouse, and then back to the key-
board. In the Expectancy blocks from the present experiment we
replicated the original procedurewith two exceptions: participants
reported their bets verbally, while maintaining their ﬁngers on the
response keys, and the encoding of each prediction was entered in
the computer by the experimenter, and was followed by the next
Stroop trial after an RSI of 750 ms, just as during the standard
Stroop task. In this way, even though our main interest was still
focused on the analysis of the CSE observed during the standard
Stroop blocks, we were also able to explore the effects of congru-
ency that might be observed on the Expectancy blocks. Duthoo
et al. (2013) reported that a close association between expectan-
cies and congruency effects was obtained when both measures
were taken on the very same trials. Thus, an additional objective
of this study was to ascertain whether this association between
expectancies and congruency effects could be extended to the reg-
ular Stroop trials when participants have enough time to develop a
prediction, or whether such association could be rather restricted
to conditions in which expectancies were generated in response to
explicit task demands.
Alpha level was set at 0.05 for all reported analyses. Wherever
there was a risk of violation of the sphericity assumption, we relied
on the Greenhouse–Geisser εˆ-corrected p values, but we reported
the nominal degrees of freedom for simplicity. We will restrict the
report to the analyses of RT, but we conﬁrmed in each case that
the reported effects could not be explained in terms of a trade-off
between speed and accuracy. In the Stroop blocks, we analyzed the
effect of congruency, the ﬁrst-order (i.e., standard) CSE, and the
progressive CSE, deﬁned as the progressive changes in the effect of
congruency which depended on the type and length of the last run
of trials3. As for the Expectancy blocks, we assessed participants’
expectancies in the contexts deﬁned by the same runs of trials,
and we also analyzed whether these expectancies were consistent
with their speeded performance, either during the regular Stroop
blocks, or during the same blocks in which the expectancies were
measured.
STROOP BLOCKS
As in Jiménez and Méndez (2013), we excluded the ﬁrst trial from
each block, those trials containing an error, and the trial imme-
diately following an error, as well as outliers, deﬁned as those
trials with RT straying more than 3 standard deviations from
each block and individual mean. In total, 6.9% of the trials from
the three Stroop blocks were excluded by applying these criteria.
Data from these three blocks were collapsed together, in order to
produce a sufﬁcient number of observations even for larger con-
texts. The measure of RT was submitted to an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with Congruency (2) and Previous Congruency (2) as
repeated factors. This analysis showed a strong effect of Congru-
ency,F(1,17)= 36.30, p< 0.001;η2p = 0.68, but not amain effect of
Previous Congruency (F < 1). A signiﬁcant Congruency × Previ-
ous Congruency interaction, F(1,17) = 5.17, p = 0.036; η2p = 0.23,
indicated that the Stroop effect was signiﬁcantly larger after a con-
gruent trial (52 ms) than after an incongruent trial (36 ms, see
Figure 1A). Thus, the standard CSE, which had not been obtained
in the original experiment by Jiménez and Méndez with an RSI
of 0 ms, was observed in this case by using a larger RSI, and in
conditions in which these sequential effects were properly dis-
tinguished from the potential inﬂuence of feature repetitions (cf.
Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 2004), aswell as fromcontingency
learning confounds (Schmidt and De Houwer, 2011; Schmidt and
Weissman, 2014).
The analysis of the progressive variation of these congruency
effects depending on the type and length of the previous run of
trials was conducted using context (6: runs of 3, 2, or 1 congruent
trials, and runs of 1, 2, and 3 incongruent trials) and Congru-
ency (2) as repeated factors. Again, this analysis showed a robust
effect of Congruency, F(1,17) = 28.10, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.62,
but not an effect of context (F < 1). The Congruency × Context
interaction was also signiﬁcant in this analysis, F(5,85) = 3.35,
p = 0.02; η2p = 0.17, and it was qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant linear
contrast, F(1,17) = 10.40, p = 0.005; η2p = 0.38, which conﬁrmed
that the effect of congruency was inversely proportional to the
amount of conﬂict accumulated over the last few trials. Thus, it
reached larger values in the context of previous congruent trials
(62, 63, and 41 ms, respectively, after runs of 3, 2, or 1 previous
3Regardless of the nominal “runs” of trials introduced by design to generate a bal-
anced sequence, these analyses were conducted considering all the trials satisfying
the criteria for a given type and length of context. Thus, for instance, the second
congruent trial from a nominal run of three consecutive congruent trials (C,C,C,-)
was not only the context for a forthcoming successor, but also the successor of a
shorter context.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Congruency sequence effects (CSE). (B) Progressive
variation of the congruency effects depending on the type and length of
the previous run of trials. (C) Dissociation between the Congruency effects
as taken from the standard Stroop blocks (left axis) and the expectancy
scores taken from the Expectancy blocks (right axis). (D) Congruency
effects as measured on the Expectancy blocks, represented separately for
trials in which participants expected a congruent or an incongruent
successor.
congruent trial), and decreased to values of 49, 25, and 12 ms
in the contexts deﬁned by 1, 2, or 3 consecutive incongruent tri-
als (see Figure 1B). This pattern of results was largely consistent
with that found in Jiménez and Méndez (2013), and it showed
that the conﬂict adaptation effect did not arise immediately after
a single trial of each type. Thus, even though we obtained a sig-
niﬁcant CSE when we assessed the effect in the standard way, it
is important to notice that this sequential effect depended on the
accumulation of several previous trials of the same type, and it was
not observed if we remove the impact of larger runs and compare
speciﬁcally the congruency effect provoked by a single congruent
trial (x,I,C,-), with that obtained after a single incongruent trial
(x,C,I,-). In this case, the effect of congruency was numerically
smaller after a congruent trial (41 ms) than after an incongruent
trial (49 ms).
EXPECTANCY BLOCKS
Participants’ expectancies were coded for each trial as in Jiménez
and Méndez (2013), by scoring 1, 2, or 3 points for the respective
bets in favor of a congruent successor, and by changing the sign
to −1, −2, or −3 for the corresponding bets made in favor of
an incongruent successor. We collapsed those values over the two
expectancy blocks, and conducted anANOVA on these scores with
context (6) as a single repeated factor. The analysis showed that
the expectancy scores were signiﬁcantly affected by the Context,
F(5,85) = 6.35, p < 0.01; η2p = 0.27. As predicted by a rep-
etition expectancy account, participants predicted a congruent
successor after a single congruent trial (0.50), and an incongruent
successor after a single incongruent trial (−0.44). These two pre-
dictions were signiﬁcantly different from each other, t(17) = 3.68,
p = 0.002. In contrast, after a longer series composed of two or
three trials of the same type, participants predicted an alternation
pattern, as if they fell into the gambler’s fallacy. Speciﬁcally, after
a row of three congruent trials participants predicted an incon-
gruent successor (−0.85), whereas after a similar row of three
incongruent trials they reported to expect a congruent successor
(0.76). These two predictions were also signiﬁcantly different from
each other, t(17) = 3.15, p = 0.006.
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The compensation bias arising in the expectancy scores repli-
cated the results reported in Jiménez and Méndez (2013), and it
stood in sharp contrast with the RT distribution obtained over
the regular Stroop blocks. Figure 1C represents the congruency
effects observed on the relevant contexts from the standard Stroop
blocks, together with the expectancy measures taken over analo-
gous contexts from the Expectancy blocks. As it can be observed,
the ﬁgure shows a striking dissociation between both measures,
showing larger increases of the effect of congruency precisely in
those contexts in which participants declare to be expecting an
incongruent successor (i.e., after runs of two or three consecu-
tive congruent trials), and showing larger decreases of this effect
in those contexts in which participants reported to be expecting
a congruent successor. This pattern is not compatible with the
claim that explicit expectancies directly modulate the effect of
congruency in the standard Stroop task, and therefore indicates
that having enough time to elicit a prediction is not enough for
participants to generate those predictions, and to rely on them in
the context of a standard Stroop task.
In the face of the dissociation observed between congruency
effects and expectancy scores when they are gathered from analo-
gous contexts, but out of different blocks of trials, one may wonder
whether a similar dissociation could also be obtained when one
looks at both effects strictly at the same moment. The results
from Duthoo et al. (2013) indicated that expectancies and con-
gruency effects were closely associated when both measures were
taken on the very same trials. Thus, to assess whether a simi-
lar association could arise over the Expectancy blocks from the
present experiment, we classiﬁed each trial from the Expectancy
blocks in two different categories, depending on whether the
participants declared to be expecting a congruent or an incon-
gruent successor, and we looked at the effects of congruency
observed in those trials depending on these explicit expectan-
cies. An ANOVA conducted on the RT from the Expectancy
blocks with declared Expectancy (2) and Congruency (2) as
two repeated factors, showed no signiﬁcant effect of Expectancy,
F(1,17) = 1.22, p = 0.29, but it showed a signiﬁcant effect of
Congruency, F(1,17) = 22.95, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.58, and a sig-
niﬁcant Expectancy × Congruency interaction, F(1,17) = 11.38,
p = 0.004; η2p = 0.40. As shown in Figure 1D, these results indi-
cate that, in the Expectancy blocks in which the participants were
required to generate a prediction, the effect of congruency was
indeed associated with those explicit predictions: even though the
effect of congruency was signiﬁcant even in those trials in which
the participants declared to be expecting an incongruent succes-
sor (775 vs. 814 ms), t(17) = 3.48, p = 0.003, the effect was much
larger when they reported to be expecting a congruent successor
(722 vs. 857 ms).
DISCUSSION
This study replicated a previous dissociation reported in Jiménez
and Méndez (2013) between explicit expectancies and conﬂict
adaptation effects, in conditions in which the effects of total
and partial repetitions were controlled (cf. Mayr et al., 2003;
Hommel et al., 2004), and in which the measures of expectancies
and the effects of conﬂict adaptation were assessed independently
over different sets of Stroop blocks. The results indicate that the
dissociation originally obtained using an RSI of 0 ms can also be
extended to less restrictive temporal conditions, and particularly
that it can be generalized to an RSI of 750 ms, an interval which
should leave plenty of time for any potential strategic adjustment
to take place (cf. Notebaert et al., 2006). Under these conditions,
the explicit predictions elicited in the context of the Expectancy
blocks reﬂect a compensation bias, which tends to predict a change
after a series of two or more trials of the same congruency type.
Thus, participants report to be expecting an incongruent successor
after a run of two or more congruent trials, and a congruent suc-
cessor after a series of two or more incongruent trials. In contrast,
the effect of congruency, as measured over the standard Stroop
blocks, shows an opposite pattern that decreases progressively
with the accumulation of conﬂict, thus growing to their maximal
scores after a series of consecutive congruent trials, and decreasing
to their minimal values after a series of consecutive incongruent
trials. Thus, in sharp contrast to any expectancy account of the
CSE, these results indicate that the effect of congruency decreases
precisely in those contexts in which the participants report to be
expecting a congruent successor, and reaches its maximal levels
in those contexts in which participants report to be expecting an
incongruent successor.
Interestingly, the dissociation observed between congruency
and expectancy scores when both measures were taken from inde-
pendent blocks was no longer maintained when they were taken
from the very same trials, that is, when the congruency effects
were computed in a context that explicitly required participants
to elicit an explicit expectancy on each trial. In those conditions,
which resembled those arranged by Duthoo et al. (2013), we found
an association between expectancies and congruency effects, indi-
cating that the reported expectancies were indeed efﬁcacious to
modulate RT when they were actually elicited in response to an
expectancy test. Thus, the failure to obtain a direct effect of the
expectancies over the standard Stroop blocks, together with the
observation that this effect exists in the expectancy blocks, could
be taken to indicate that such explicit expectancies are not built by
default, even if there is enough time available to do that, but that
they may be generated on request, and of course in that case they
affect performance.
The most important discrepancy between the results reported
by Duthoo et al. (2013) and those obtained in the present exper-
iment, and in the previous experiments by Jiménez and Méndez
(2013), refers to the speciﬁc pattern of expectancies observed
in each paradigm. Thus, whereas Duthoo et al. (2013) reported
that their participants kept predicting repetitions even after a
series of two or three trials of the same type, according to what
they dubbed as “the hot-hand fallacy,” our participants showed
a less extended propensity to predict repetitions, and they felt
quickly into the opposite “gambler’s fallacy.” We can only spec-
ulate about the possible source of this empirical difference, but
we surmise that the use of just two colors in the case of the
study by Duthoo et al. (2013) instead of the four different col-
ors arranged in our paradigm, may be partially responsible of
producing a difference in the perceived likelihood of repetitions,
and may ultimately affect their expectancy scores. In any case, our
results did closely replicate the dissociation pattern ﬁrst reported
by Jiménez and Méndez (2013), and they conﬁrmed that such
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dissociation is not exclusive of those speeded conditions which
leave no room for top–down preparation, and that the effect
of explicit predictions may be absent unless they are explicitly
requested.
Thus, coming back to the original question underlying this
research topic, about the status of conﬂict adaptation effects, we
would like to conclude by suggesting that many of the so-called
“reactive” conﬂict adaptation effects, rather than being exerted
by some “shadow” set of control mechanisms, which exert the
same functions as those fulﬁlled by the proactive mechanisms,
but only in a faster, more automatic, and less conscious mode,
could be better explained as the integrated outcome of a mixture
of mechanisms which may have not been designed speciﬁcally for
such control purposes, but which take advantage of the system’s
past experience to respond to new events in ways similar to those
which were proven effective in the past. From this point view,
ﬁnally, these mechanisms, which may comprise those processes
underlying phenomena such as perceptual priming, process prim-
ing, episodic memory, implicit contingency learning, temporal
learning, and the like, perhaps should not be taken as potential
confounds, or as alternatives to the genuine “mechanism” of reac-
tive control. Rather, they could just be considered as components
of the cognitive toolbox which, together, implement this delicately
adaptive, automatic, complex, and highly dynamic, function of
control.
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